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Abstract: Since the late 1990s, the government has used outsourced electronic 
monitoring (also known as tagging) in England and Wales for criminal 
sentencing and punishment. Under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of 
Claimants) Act 2004, s36, the use of this technology extended to immigration 
controls, and individuals deemed as ‘high risk’ of harm, reoffending or 
absconding can be fitted with an ankle device and subjected to curfew. The 
tagging of migrants is not authorised by the criminal court and therefore not 
considered a punitive sanction. It is managed by the immigration system and 
treated as an administrative matter. Nevertheless, people who are tagged 
experience it as imprisonment and punishment. Drawing on data from an 
eighteen-month ethnographic research project, this article examines the impact 
of electronic monitoring on people seeking asylum, who completed their 
sentences for immigration offences. It uncovers the psychological effects and 
mental health impacts of such technologies of control. The article sheds light on 
how tagging is experienced by racialised minorities, and adds to the literature 
on migration, surveillance studies, state racism and violence. 
Keywords: crimmigration, electronic monitoring, e-carceration, surveillance, 
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Introduction and background: Electronic monitoring – from criminal justice 
to (cr)immigration control 
I don’t believe it was a crime [i.e. using a fake passport]. But I completed 
time in prison … When they let me out, this thing [i.e. tag] was put on my 
leg. Home Office just put this on me. Even if I committed a crime – this 
is no way to treat a human. I am a human, you know. They cannot punish 
me all the time … when I look at this – sometimes I laugh, sometimes I 
cry. Sometimes I ask myself – why me? It is very stressful for me … the 
other day I went to Church for praying and when I kneel down, this [i.e. 
tag] just started hurting my leg. I cannot even pray in peace … when I tell 
people at Church what is happening to me, they get really angry at Home 
Office. They get angry to know such things are still happening in Britain.  
(Interview with Gracie) 
 
Electronic monitoring (EM) was implemented under the Criminal Justice Act 
1991, s 13.1 It is a surveillance tool designed to track offenders and suspects, 
verify their whereabouts and establish remotely whether they are complying 
with a set of pre-established conditions which are part of the requirements of 
their sentence. EM was introduced to address prison overcrowding and the 
rising costs of incarceration,2 and is intended to bring about decarceration and 
diversion from custody. England and Wales now have the highest number of 
individuals subjected to this technology in the world; however, its utility in 
reducing the size of prison populations is questionable – and high use of 
imprisonment is linked with high use of EM.3 This casts doubts over whether 
EM has the ability to reduce prison numbers or if it plays a role in expanding 
criminal justice interventions – Stan Cohen terms this the net-widening effect.4 
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The use of EM is justified by penal reformers on the basis that it is a softer or 
more humane form of punishment when compared to imprisonment. 
Nevertheless, such positioning tends to lack sufficient critical reflection and 
does not fully consider the issues around (dis)proportionality and (un)necessity 
of the sanction, and how the surveillance is experienced by different groups of 
people. The use of EM can unfairly punish those belonging to disadvantaged 
and marginalised backgrounds, who are likely to serve the sentence in 
deplorable conditions.5 Scholars and activists critical of EM or ‘carceral 
humanism’ more broadly oppose such non-abolitionist and reformist 
alternatives and view the technology as an extension of confinement.6 
 
Whilst the EM technology has expanded surveillance possibilities for 
authorities, the evidence of its effectiveness in reducing re-offending is rather 
minimal.7 EM has led to a move away from the traditional values of probation 
that focused on rehabilitation and care.8 The increasing use of EM is associated 
with a reduction in the involvement of the probation services, and the lack of 
credibility and reliability of probation services (due to part privatisation) in 
England and Wales has contributed to the growing number of people subjected 
to EM.9  Further, the recent introduction of Global Positioning Tracker (GPS) 
devices has a potential to eliminate (or drastically reduce) human contact and 
replace it with intrusive round-the-clock surveillance. These advancements add 
to the troubling legal and ethical questions about the ever-expanding 
surveillance state. 
 
EM emerged a result of the transformation of the penal field – which turned 
the focus away from rehabilitation and towards identification, management 
and control of those deemed as risky groups.10 EM is used to deliver 
managerialist solutions to complex social problems, and it has resulted in the 
marketisation and outsourcing of the justice system.11 Tagging is operated 
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exclusively by the private sector in England and Wales, and the EM market is 
highly oligopolistic (with only four or five companies bidding for lucrative 
government contracts). Despite the sparse or inconclusive evidence around 
the effectiveness of the technology, and on-going Serious Fraud Office 
investigations of G4S, the company was awarded a £25million contract in 
2017 by the British government.12 The cost of running EM between 
2017/2018 and 2024/2025 is likely to be in the range of £130million.13 The 
growing use of EM and corporate re-shaping of criminal justice presents a clear 
threat to the integrity of the system and will lead to growing numbers of people 
finding themselves subject to perpetual criminalisation, surveillance and 
control.14 This, of course, will continue to increase the profit margins of private 
security companies. Scholars have raised serious concerns over the lack of 
independent oversight of the EM industry and insufficient monitoring by 
governmental bodies, especially considering the unscrupulous nature of the 
commercial sector and a need for accountability.15  
 
EM is increasingly termed as ‘e-carceration’,16 and it shifts the site of 
confinement to homes. Those who are incarcerated17 experience what Gresham 
Sykes calls the ‘pains of imprisonment’.18 A research project on EM noted that 
individuals experienced all of these pains while being subjected to tag and 
curfew. In addition, they suffered pains that were not experienced by those 
incarcerated, which included: financial or monetary implications of not being 
able to work adequate hours due to restrictions or inability to find job due to 
criminal record; increased stress in relationships; dehumanisation/stigma of 
wearing the ankle monitor; and emotional effects of watching others get on with 
their lives while being subjected to restrictions.19 Further, tagging (just as the 
punishment system overall) is designed for men and it may impact on women 
differently.20 And black people on probation rate such alternative sanctions 
more severely than white people and identify more strongly with reasons to 
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avoid alternative sanctions.21 Their concerns are largely around the potential 
mistreatment at the hands of parole and probation officers and other personnel 
that oversee the alternative punishment – all of which may increase the risk of 
revocation and imprisonment. Despite the issues and growing concerns around 
the use of this technology, there are no official studies or academic research (in 
Britain or internationally) on how ethnic and racial groups experience EM and 
the impact of surveillance on their lives. 
 
Through the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004, 
s36,22 the British state extended the use of EM to migration controls. This was 
happening against the backdrop of penal transformations. People who are 
released from immigration detention on bail have conditions attached to their 
release, such as, reporting to the immigration authorities or police, staying at the 
property stated on the bail application, or a requirement for a surety to post bail 
money, payable should they abscond from the conditions. In addition, EM can 
be used as a condition by the Home Office for those who are considered at risk 
of absconding, re-offending and/or potential to cause harm to public. One of the 
differences in the use of EM within criminal justice and immigration system is 
time – whilst criminal sentences involving EM are determinate in nature,23 the 
immigration system uses it with no upper limit and/or clear guidelines around 
time.  
 
Britain is the only EU member state to use EM in the migration arena.24 The 
tagging is not intended to be punitive, and it is not the criminal courts that 
authorise it. It is rather an administrative measure enforced by the immigration 
system. EM is not imposed as a criminal sanction, and yet consent is not taken 
from the subject and there is no statutory requirement to seek consent as such. 
In one of the official reports, the former Immigration Minister Tony McNulty 
(2005-2006) justifies the removal of consent stating that:   
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asking for the subject's consent is inconsistent with any other area of 
contact management ... That is why I agreed a change in the policy … to 
allow the Immigration Service to draw up contact management plans 
without first seeking the consent of the individual. The consideration of 
whether the individual will comply with specific requirements will be 
part of the process of deciding how best to manage contact and this 
change places us in a stronger position by enabling us to consider what 
action to take where someone fails to comply with an electronic 
monitoring requirements.25  
Unsurprisingly, given the consequences for non-cooperation, McNulty notes an 
increase in compliance, albeit in a small sample of tagged individuals. Further, 
under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, a person on immigration bail 
breaching the conditions without reasonable excuse, can be subjected to 
criminal proceedings, and if convicted they can be fined and/or receive a prison 
sentence for up to six months.26  
 
EM is considered as one of the alternatives to immigration detention. It is now 
well established in the literature that detention centres are harmful, exacerbate 
mental distress and cause a great deal of anxiety amongst those confined.27 
Also, the suicide and self-harm rates in detention (including those on suicide 
watch) remain significantly high.28 Internationally, in particular the Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in United States (US) have deployed EM as an 
alternative to detention. However, this is largely due to its perceived cost 
effectiveness. In 2018, over 38,000 immigrants were tagged in the US with GPS 
technology, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) highlighted the 
high success rate and ‘strong alien cooperation’ with such control measures.29 
Similarly, in Britain, commonly used alternatives are reporting and EM (which 
are used in combination). The reporting population is approximately 60,000, 
with a total cost of £8.6 million per year and a 95 per cent compliance rate.30 
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There are around 500 individuals currently monitored using a radio frequency 
bracelet, costing £515 per person/per month.31 Despite the existence of these 
measures, the spending on detention in Britain still remains high. The annual 
cost of detention for the year ending March 2018 was £108 million and this 
does not include the compensation for wrongful confinement.32 Also, the 
increase in alternatives over the past decade or so (in both the US and Britain) 
have not led to any serious reductions in the detention population. Therefore, 
EM (and other alternative measures) represent a net-widening of interventions 
and they supplement (rather than replace) immigration detention – resulting in 
the growth of private profit and simply treating migrants as cash cows.33 
        
The international evidence that supports (non-enforcement based) alternatives to 
detention, also opposes EM surveillance. For instance, ICE’s Family Case 
Management Program (FCMP), in which families received caseworker support 
without having to wear an ankle monitor, had 99 per cent compliance with court 
appearances and ICE appointments.34 A similar pattern was noted across 
another ICE programme where individuals who were released from detention 
between 2001 and 2016 appeared for all immigration court hearings, making the 
rate of compliance 100 per cent and rate of absconding 0 per cent.35 The studies 
around absconding in Britain are limited, but the few that exist counter the 
official ‘flight risk’ narrative. In one of the studies, researchers analysed the 
records of a charity organisation called Bail for Immigration Detainees, to trace 
ninety-eight asylum detainees who were bailed between July 2000 and October 
2001.36 They concluded that over 90 per cent complied with ordinary bail 
conditions and did not abscond. Another piece of research found that 
absconding rates varied between 3 and 12 per cent, indicating a high degree of 
inefficiency – because as many as 97 per cent of individuals due for deportation 
did not abscond.37 Of course, simply being tagged does not help individuals to 
resolve their cases or navigate the legal system – on the contrary, it makes it 
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more difficult to participate in community-based assistance.38 Therefore, EM is 
an ineffective non-alternative alternative, and it simply extends enforcement 
measures.  
 
In Britain, EM cannot be imposed unless individuals have fixed 
accommodation. This is because radio frequency tags require a fixed location 
for the equipment to be set-up.39 However, such a requirement does not exist in 
the US as ICE uses GPS monitors. In recent months, the use of GPS in 
migration control has raised very serious privacy concerns and erosion of rights. 
On 7 August 2019, ICE executed criminal search warrants at seven food 
processing plants in the state of Mississippi, and apprehended nearly 700 
migrants – one of the biggest worksite enforcement actions in the country’s 
history.40 In a coordinated sting, ICE tracked the movement of individuals 
wearing GPS devices and recorded patterns around times spent at specific 
locations. The tag provided actionable intelligence and assisted authorities in 
arresting illegalised and deportable migrants who were not given the permission 
to work. In this case, the tracking went well beyond its original purpose and 
goal of stopping people from absconding and was used as a ‘drag-net’ to trap 
and draw migrants into the criminal justice sphere.   
In 2016, the court ruled that the Home Office had no legislative authority to 
automatically impose curfews and restrict individual liberty.41 As a result of the 
judgement, viable claims for false imprisonment can be bought forward if one 
can prove that curfew requirements were imposed unlawfully. Nevertheless, the 
practice of tagging/curfew itself has not ceased and is rather evolving to become 
more expansive and invasive. In Britain, GPS trackers are not used in the 
immigration domain as yet; however, the bail guidance indicates that the 
accommodation requirement is likely to be removed when the Home Office 
moves to using GPS technology (which has already been rolled out by the 
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criminal justice system since 2019).42 When combined with the enforcement 
visit system already set in place,43 changes to the bail regime introduced through 
the Immigration Act 201644 and ever growing crimmigration controls45 are 
likely to create another layer of punitive dragnet. Also, the number of those 
subjected to tagging is very likely to increase, as the technological limitations of 
the old devices will be removed.   
The aim of this article is twofold: firstly, it critically explores the use of EM in 
the migration arena as a racial surveillance practice. Second, by presenting 
narratives and experiences of migrants, the article uncovers the psychological 
effects and mental health impact on those subjected to this surveillance 
technology. It draws data from eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork, 
which includes participant observation at three refugee charity organisations, 
gathering and analysing case files and other documentary evidence, interviews 
with specialist practitioners (n=6; and included two charity social workers, a 
Primary Care Trust doctor, a clinical psychologist and managers from a 
homeless shelter and a migrant rights charity, respectively) and people seeking 
asylum (n=22). The individuals quoted in this article were imprisoned for 
committing immigration offences (mostly possessing or using a false passport), 
released on completion of sentence and consequently tagged for being 
considered ‘at risk of absconding’. And at the time of interview they were 
awaiting decision on their asylum claims. It should be noted that EM is also 
extended to those on control orders and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures,46 however, these individuals were not a part of the study. To maintain 
the confidentiality and anonymity of participants, pseudonyms are used 
throughout this article (and for further discussions on ethical and practical 
issues faced, see Bhatia47).  
Electronic monitoring as racial surveillance 
10 
 
The idea of surveillance as a disciplinary tool can be traced back to the 
eighteenth century panopticon writings of Bentham. In 1975, Foucault revisited 
the idea and used the panopticon metaphorically as a way to exemplify 
disciplinary societies.48 It is often argued that Foucault’s work led social 
theorists to take ‘surveillance seriously in its own right’.49 In the book called 
Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness, Browne subjects the 
panopticon to interrogation through the reading of the slave ship.50 By 
rethinking Bentham’s ideas through the architectural plan of The Brooks, 
Browne shows that historical formations of surveillance are inextricably linked 
with the historical formations of slavery and colonialism. Further, she critically 
reinterprets Foucault’s panopticon and demonstrates the ways in which the 
techniques of disciplinary power were always violent towards the black body – 
which continued throughout slavery and beyond. Browne builds a theory of 
racialising surveillance – spaces where surveillance practices, policies and 
performances define what is in or out of place. The absented presence of the 
history of racial formation and policing bodies of colour is central to 
understanding how different forms of surveillance reify borders and boundaries 
along racial lines.   
The connection between today’s surveillance and migration control must be 
viewed in the context of slavery, colonialism and empire. According to Sharma, 
since the late fifteenth century, European empires actively engaged in moving 
people through slavery, debt bondage, penal labour, and in late imperialism, 
nascent immigration regimes.51 What we have today is a globalised system of 
controls in which it is nearly impossible to move freely across nationalised 
borders – more specifically for the poor from the Global South. The 
contemporary social sorting has rapidly expanded new forms of borders and 
boundaries, some of which rely on new technologies and aim to control and 
exclude the poor and dispossessed.52 Surveillance operates at external and 
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internal borders, and also through everyday bordering, and it targets migrants 
constructed as ‘unwanted’ and ‘risky’.53  For instance, within Britain, a number 
of surveillance measures have been deployed: in 2009/10, the Home Office 
made use of genetic and isotope testing for border control purposes. The aim of 
molecular tests was to ascertain ancestry and geographical origins of subjects 
through the use of a DNA database, and the intention was to include results of 
genetic ancestry in live asylum applications to detect ‘bogus’ claims. Whilst the 
practice was terminated due to wide spread criticisms from the scientific 
community, it nevertheless shed light on genomic surveillance and profiling, the 
willingness to subject negatively racialised groups to experimental technologies 
(circumventing ethics) and the extent of border control’s entanglement with 
discourses on race and crime.54,55 Further, in 2019, reports emerged of the Home 
Office subjecting asylum seekers to street-level surveillance by tracking the 
usage of ASPEN card56 spending.57 And since 2013, and through an amendment 
of the Police Act 1997,58 immigration officials are granted power over property 
interference, including interference with equipment, which can involve planting 
listening devices, as well as hacking into phones or computers.59 The emergence 
and rapid growth of ‘crimmigration controls’ in Britain has led to surveillance 
and technologies traditionally used for crime control purposes being drawn into 
migration control. The following section takes this further and explains the 
impact of surveillance on people seeking asylum. 
Psychological harms of racial surveillance  
There are no academic studies that highlight the lived experiences and voices of 
migrants and racialised groups who are subjected to constant surveillance 
through EM.60 More importantly, the psychological effects and harms on 
migrants resulting from this surveillance are not fully understood. The rest of 
this article draws on ethnographic data to address some of these voids in 
migration, race and ethnicity, and surveillance studies literature. 
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The pains of (non-punishment) punishment 
The use of EM is linked to the hysteria around the racialised figure of ‘foreign 
national criminals’ – a group that is doubly damned for its ‘foreignness’ and for 
committing a crime – and thereby subjected to highly unjust and harsh 
treatment.61 All the participants in this study who were placed on EM had 
completed custodial sentences for immigration offences and a few had also 
spent additional time in immigration detention (held under administrative 
powers).  On release, they were asked to appear at the immigration reporting 
centre in person, either weekly or fortnightly, and tagging was used as an 
additional measure. Participants were not offered an explanation as to why the 
device was attached to their ankles and why they were placed on curfew (which 
lasted anywhere between 8 and 12 hours). Individuals were told that breaking 
the monitoring conditions or tampering with the device could result in arrest 
and/or negative decision on their immigration and asylum cases. EM was used 
for immigration control purposes – an administrative decision taken by the 
Home Office. Nevertheless, since it occurred soon after participants were 
released from confinement (and completing a prison term), they experienced it 
as continuation of punishment. This had harmful consequences for their health 
and well-being. For instance, Inam explained the impact of indefinite 
monitoring, confinement and lack of liberty on his mental health. He started 
consuming large amounts of drugs and psychoactive substances to distort the 
perception of time, escape punishment and numb the feeling of becoming 
trapped. Inam mentioned:  
They said prison is over, but it was not. I felt in prison with that 
thing [i.e. tag] … they came every week to check the tag. I was very 
upset and thinking, I keep talking to myself: ‘what has happened to 
me?’. All I did was smoke drugs, take pills at house and fall asleep. 
So much pressure and depression and no freedom … I have not done 
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anything wrong. I just wanted life. This is shit life, this is no life. 
Whenever I don’t take drug, I felt like suicide. My pain was going 
away after smoking drugs. You take drugs and fall asleep and don’t 
think ... 
(Interview with Inam) 
Inam was an asylum-seeking individual from Iran and fleeing persecution. His 
mental health rapidly deteriorated after arriving in Britain, and he went through 
a prolonged period of destitution and homelessness. After being refused asylum, 
Inam chose to ‘escape’62 Britain with the help of a false passport, and was 
subsequently caught and prosecuted. Elsewhere I have argued that the British 
government has created a ‘dragnet’ by moving immigration breaches from the 
civil domain and into the domain of criminal law.63 As a result, people who 
commit these ‘offences’ are trapped in the penal circuits and treated as 
‘dangerous’ foreigners.  The subsequent imprisonment and punishment 
exacerbate their mental distress and/or create new conditions, and this results in 
(re)traumatisation. The British government’s treatment of migrants must be 
viewed through the state racism and violence framework, as people are 
deliberately trapped and corralled in excruciating conditions and punishment 
and suffering is a result of strategic and carefully calculated shifts in laws, 
policies and practices.64 The use of EM surveillance is another way through 
which racist violence is inflicted on migrants.  
On release from prison, Inam was not offered Home Office support. He started 
living with another individual from Iran who was recognised as a refugee, and 
whom he met at a community centre and became friends with. Due to Inam’s 
situation, the friend agreed to host him for few weeks and also agreed for the 
EM contractors to fit radio frequency equipment at his property. Inam received 
a small amount of pocket money from his friend, and did not contribute towards 
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food, rent or utility bills. A few months later, Inam was asked to leave the 
property and make other arrangements as he had outstayed his welcome. Also, 
the friend started experiencing financial problems and could not support him 
any further. The social workers at a local refugee charity organisation 
intervened and applied for Section 4 Support65 on Inam’s behalf, which was 
subsequently refused by the Home Office. The monitoring officers were 
informed about the change in circumstances and they arranged for the removal 
of the tag. Somehow, destitution and homelessness resulted in Inam getting 
released from monitoring (which lasted for approximately seven months). As 
mentioned earlier, due to its technical limitations, EM can only be applied to 
persons who have fixed addresses. Having a fixed address also makes them easy 
to track and of low flight risk; therefore, the stigma and pain of EM is grossly 
disproportionate to the so-called ‘flight risk’ individuals pose.  Once again, 
Inam started sleeping in homeless shelters and on the streets, and his mental 
health continued to deteriorate.  
In the criminal justice context, community sanctions and non-prison alternatives 
(including EM) are often justified on the basis that they keep individuals out of 
custody and therefore avoid harms associated with imprisonment, realise 
rehabilitative objectives, enable community reintegration, allow them to 
continue with work and other commitments, and at the same time introduce 
daily structure into their routine.66 According to the analysis, the use of EM in 
immigration controls does not achieve any of the above. Individuals who were 
tagged (following the completion of their sentences) did not receive any 
supervision or support.  Also, since EM forms a part of an administrative 
process (and not a criminal sanction), it was not clear as to how it stopped 
people ‘reoffending’ – especially since evidence of its effectiveness in reducing 
recidivism in the criminal justice context remains inconclusive. There are no 
governmental audits or evaluation of the use of EM technology in immigration 
15 
 
control (and even if such reports exist, the information is not made publicly 
available).  
The main goal of the immigration system is not to integrate or rehabilitate, but 
segregate and confine illegalised and racialised bodies into designated ‘waiting 
zones’ (which can be in community or detention centres), subject them to 
surveillance and eventually deportation and banishment – Kalir terms this the 
‘Departheid’ system.67 The individuals in this study were not granted 
permission to work, and only three out of seven tagged were given 
accommodation and cashless support in the form of a prepaid card. Within the 
psychiatry literature, it is highlighted that the lack of work and material 
deprivation amplifies post-migratory stress.68 This results in the intensification 
of suffering more generally. Like Inam, another individual called Rizwan was 
also seeking asylum and was not offered any material support or granted the 
right to work.  He was also living with a friend. Officers fitted him with a tag 
and imposed awkward curfew hours upon him, which made it difficult for him 
to participate in social activities, resulting in deeper exclusion and isolation. 
Besides the tag, he was also asked to present himself weekly at the reporting 
centre which was located in a different city. He explained: 
One day they just said you are getting released and then asked me to 
report at the Home Office signing centre every week. The signing 
centre is far and I have to spend £5-6 in bus/train. It may not sound 
like a big money to you, but how will I get this money? They don’t 
let me work and they don’t give me money and it is they who are 
asking me to sign. It is not easy £5 for me. They also came and put 
this [tag] … 
Sometimes they [monitoring officers] call me to ask: ‘where have 
you been?’ When I say that I’ve been here or there, then they ask: 
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‘why did you go there?’ If you don’t go out, they give you a call and 
ask ‘why have you not been out?’ and once they ask me ‘you are 
alive, yeah?’ [emphasis added by the participant]. That is stupid! 
They don’t give me money and they don’t understand that if I go out 
for anything, even to XYZ [supermarket name] – I will have to 
spend money … When I was inside in the prison everyone said ‘one 
day you will be released’. This is not release!   
(Interview with Rizwan) 
Having gone through a suicidal phase in prison, on release Rizwan approached 
the doctor for anti-depressants and was taking control of his health and trying to 
manage the condition. Nevertheless, the intensity of punishment, the constant 
feeling of being watched and uncertainty about the future often triggered 
negative thoughts and made him ‘feel down’.69 At the time of the first interview, 
Rizwan mentioned that he had been tagged for over eight months (and his 
tagging lasted in total for seven months). Both the Home Office and the EM 
contracting company were made aware of his suicide and self-harm history and 
the doctor requested authorities to lift the curfew hours and remove the device 
on several occasions to prevent further damage to his health. Instead of 
acknowledging and accepting the doctor’s requests, monitoring officers called 
Rizwan occasionally and asked highly intrusive and stigmatising questions 
about his mental state. Not only does this demonstrate a lack of acceptance of 
mental distress as genuine health problem, but also negligence and failure in 
their duty of care. 
Surveillance, mental health and the culture of disbelief 
The Home Office can be requested to remove the tag from bail conditions, if it 
can be demonstrated that the tagged person is particularly vulnerable to the 
distress it causes. The analysis of data indicates that authorities only considered 
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removing the device if the individual showed signs of ‘visible’ physical 
ailments. Due to its apparent lack of ‘visibility’, mental distress was often 
disbelieved, and individuals exhibiting distress were viewed as ‘faking it’70 to 
escape surveillance and controls. In one observed case, this disbelief eventually 
resulted in a severe physical health reaction. One of the female asylum seekers 
suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and anxiety was tagged 
for over three months. All her requests to remove the tag were largely ignored 
and eventually she started exhibiting high blood pressure and severe chest pain, 
and was consequently admitted to the hospital. The information was once again 
passed on to the authorities, who eventually acknowledged her medical note and 
agreed to lift the EM condition. According to a Primary Care Trust practitioner, 
Dr McDonald, the Home Office decision-making (or lack of) is ill-informed and 
problematic.  He explained: 
… [Home Office] have always hesitated to accept sick notes … and 
there are cases where they have actively discriminated between 
physical and mental health. They will phone up or fax to say that: 
‘you have sent us this letter and we cannot accept. However, if you 
write a sick note outlining a physical illness then we “might” be able 
to consider that’. I had to write to the management saying that you 
are discriminating and frankly speaking this is on false premises and 
dodgy grounds ... Now all this only takes place when they choose to 
reply to the sick notes or letters that we write.   
(Interview with Dr McDonald) 
Such practices indicate a strong reluctance amongst officials to accept mental 
health as a genuine condition and treat it as a ‘get out clause’. The medical sick-
notes were also ignored on the false premise that mental health and psychiatric 
issues can only be treated by the psychiatrists in secondary care, and 
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immigration case workers, monitoring officers and private security staff 
frequently demanded specialist reports. While secondary care is necessary in 
acute cases, the National Health Service has a series of guidelines for referrals 
to the secondary care. Also, the referral process can be time consuming and 
until then the patient is often looked after by a general practitioner. The 
authorities frequently challenged general practitioners’ sick notes and this was 
repeatedly observed during the fieldwork. Therefore, Dr McDonald was asked 
the following during the interview: 
 
M: Do you think that your status as a Primary Care Doctor makes it 
difficult to get the message across that a patient is facing mental health 
issues? 
Dr M: Yes, all the time. Quite often they say ‘why haven’t you 
referred them to a psychiatrist’, and I go back and say that 
management of post-traumatic stress is within primary care and it is 
appropriate for me to be managing people in primary care … We have 
at any one time here about 150 patients with PTSD on DSM-IV-TR 
criteria. We are very stringent about the diagnosis … and on occasions 
we also refer cases to trauma focused psychological treatments … If 
you look at the guidelines and criteria of managing PTSD, it is ideally 
in the community. I’ve gone back to the officials and have said this on 
several occasions. 
M: So, do they consider your sick note after that explanation? 
Dr M: Well, it is random really, sometimes they do, sometimes they 
don’t. It is very inconsistent. It is very frustrating … There doesn’t 
seem to be any consistent policy on what they accept, who they accept 
it from. It sometimes depends on the individual case worker; at times 
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on a particular [private security] employee … Sometimes it feels as if 
you are running in circles.71 It is very frustrating! 
(Interview with Dr McDonald) 
It was noted that increase in the severity and visibility of health breakdowns led 
to authorities treating individual sicknesses as ‘genuine’. Another practitioner, a 
charity social worker called Anita, emphasised that: ‘you literally have to be on 
the deaths door to prove you are sick and honest’.  Since the focus is on 
enforcement and controls, the racialised bodies whose suffering is not ‘visible’ 
or ‘serious enough’ often gets ignored by the bureaucrats – who have already 
been granted the permission to be cruel by the British state.72 
 
The impact of being placed under constant watch 
 
Those tagged often felt their privacy and space had been invaded, and their 
homes and every living moment became subjected to the gaze of surveillance. 
Participants explained this in various ways – for instance, during a repeat 
interview, Rizwan mentioned: ‘this is me, and this is [pointing at the tag] my 
“friend” Home Office’. Whereas, an asylum-seeking woman called Gracie said: 
‘… anything I do – sleep, eat or cry – it is there on me like a dirty ghost’. 
Similarly, another individual called Ali from Iran, who was given 
accommodation support by the Home Office and relocated to an area away from 
his social network, explained the suffocating feeling of being constantly 
watched and perceived as a ‘dangerous’ (non-white) person in public spaces: 
Rather animals are better off. I can’t play football or go to the 
gym... Every time I sit some where I have to check 100 times that 
no one can see it. The minute I sit on a chair, I look down several 
times just to make sure that it is not visible to the people  
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... when people look at it, they look at my face. I know they must 
think I am dirty or dangerous person. Sometime they look angry, 
other times they just look at this [tag] and walk away … I can’t 
sleep very well during nights, I am tired of this shit. 
(Interview with Ali) 
Ali explained that he served time in prison and was consequently released, and 
therefore should be treated as a former offender and not a ‘criminal for life’.73 
According to him, the punishment should have ended with the completion of 
prison term. Just as other participants, Ali explicitly rejected the label of 
‘criminal’. He also repeatedly highlighted the sheer injustice of disproportionate 
custodial sanction for an immigration breach. At the time of his first interview, 
Ali was tagged for 10 months (and tagging lasted for eighteen months in total). 
The final decision on his asylum case had not yet been made and he continued 
to live in uncertainty and limbo. The curfew hours were making it impossible 
for him to lead a normal and stable life. Ali stated that not only were his 
requests to remove the tag and ease the curfew conditions ignored, but every 
attempt was made by the system to keep him excluded and isolated:  
Immigration people did not even reply back to my GP and he has 
written to them more than seven times requesting to remove the 
tag... I have been to the GP and hospital so many times [emphasis 
added by participant]. Wait – see this [showing a file containing 
medical evidence and doctor notes] … I wanted to get enrolled at 
the college and college told me that because you have Section 4 
support you can enrol for free. I requested them [it was unclear 
whether participant was referring to Home Office or EM officers 
or both] to change my tag times … so that I can be at college on 
time. They told me ‘why?  Who asked you to study? Who told 
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you about the course? You are not allowed to study! You have to 
pay for it!’... College people came to know about my prison 
sentence and this tag ... College people thought I was a dangerous 
person … and they took my ID card away. I explained them and 
told them everything about what happened to me [migratory 
history, asylum case rejection, attempting to escape UK with false 
documents and getting caught and prosecuted] … and I am not a 
terrorist. Then the head said that ‘you will study here’ and trusted 
me. However, Home Office did not change the tag timing. Every 
day I go 45minutes late and my tutor is very kind and helpful.  
(Interview with Ali) 
The system placed the participants under constant surveillance without giving 
any serious consideration to their needs or potential health-risks. For Justine, 
prison and EM had caused profound emotional damage and also affected her 
relationship with her son (who turned three years of age while she was serving a 
prison sentence). While the curfew hours were not so much of a concern for her, 
it was the fear of her device becoming visible as well as the feeling of 
confinement that made it difficult to carry on with her parenting duties. Justine 
spent seven months in prison for an immigration offence and her son Kenneth 
was taken into foster care. On release, she was desperate to re-connect with the 
child, but felt obstructed due to poor mental health. To make the condition 
worse, the events leading to her release from the prison made her paranoid and 
anxious about becoming separated from her child a second time. She said: 
 
... because he [Kenneth] did not answer when people called his 
name, social workers asked me ‘is he your child?’... they said 
‘where did you born the child’, I told them ‘I born the child here’. 
Then they asked me: ‘what is the name of your midwife? which 
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hospital did you give birth?’. Why you ask me so many questions, 
I said ... then they did DNA test … then they took the result to the 
court and gave me the child after  twenty days of release ... the 
XX [EM contracting company] just walked in one day and said 
Home Office has asked to tag me and they did it ... if I hear even a 
little sound in the morning, I feel that police is coming to arrest 
me again. I can’t sleep … I can’t take my child in the park, I can’t 
take him for swimming like other mummies do ... I can’t sit like 
that. People just think ‘is she a criminal?’ You know my tag is 
from 8-10 in the night and 6-8 in the morning ... if I want to run, I 
can run away between morning and night. But what’s the point? 
My case is still pending .. .even when I go out, I just want to get 
home. I just don’t feel like staying out much.  
(Interview with Justine) 
 
The Home Office maintains that it safeguards and promotes the welfare of 
children, and while children are not subjected to EM, the tagging of family 
members has an equally damaging impact on their development and well-being. 
Justine stated that she had gotten used to living the prison life and suffered from 
a constant feeling of oppression. The EM made it difficult to overcome the 
institutionalised personality, which had started to affect her son. A child support 
worker had accompanied Justine for two research interviews, and she 
mentioned Kenneth’s learning difficulties and rapid behavioural changes, and 
that he was referred to a specialist paediatrician for a detailed medical 
assessment. In cases such as Justine’s, the imposition of monitoring may fail to 
pass the test of necessity and proportionality, as she was a low flight risk and 
parent to a young child. It was also noted that the tag did not ‘deter’ her from 
23 
 
absconding, since she was more likely to benefit from complying with 
authorities while her case was being processed (and it did not deter other 
participants either for exactly the same reason). 
 
Conclusion: resisting surveillance 
 
All the above narratives and experiences of participants have shed light on the 
sheer impact and violence inflicted through EM surveillance. However, 
individuals were not passive and rather actively resisted such coercive 
measures.74 Some approached the elected Member of Parliament in their area, 
either on their own or through gathering support (and accompanied by Church 
authorities, charity social workers, doctors and other individuals in authoritative 
positions), and demanded the removal of EM. Some frequently delivered 
speeches at events and raised awareness of the practice, and called for solidarity 
and support. One of the interviewees was in the process of suing the Home 
Office and seeking compensation for the harms caused due to the imposition of 
monitoring and curfew. Whereas, during a repeat interview, Ali mentioned his 
intention to go on a hunger strike to protest against the monitoring, as follows: 
 
M: Do you not think a hunger strike is an extreme step? 
A: No, not really. If I die, I will die with dignity ... I will die fighting 
for freedom. You know in my country people are killed for having an 
opinion, they are killed because they want freedom. I come here 
thinking I am free, but look at this thing [pointing towards the tag]. I 
feel like a prisoner in my own body. I go anywhere, this thing 
follows me. 
M: Have you spoken to your doctor?  
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A: I asked him to assess my mental health condition before I go on 
strike … so that they don’t take me to psychiatric unit ... I am taking 
my medicine. But this is not because of depression, this is because of 
frustration … My doctor recently wrote to the Home Office [Note: 
The final three lines of the letter clearly mentioned that mental 
distress caused by the tag was too much for the patient. The doctor 
also mentioned that he had written several letters in past and was 
‘upset with the lack of response from the Home Office] … Just to 
make sure that doctor does not force me into psychiatric unit – I will 
listen to him and take multivitamin to protect my liver and kidneys. 
Doctor cannot force me to eat ... It is not a suicide – it is a fight for 
freedom! 
 (Interview with Ali) 
 
Those subjected to coercive state surveillance and controls have resisted the 
practices by speaking in various ways and engaging in (desperate) acts of 
dissent. This includes suicide attempts, escapes, hunger strikes, mutilating 
fingers to avoid biometric detection and so on.7576 It is important for researchers 
to identify and document such acts wherever possible, and at the same time, 
highlight the psychological violence of surveillance and controls, and in the 
process confront state racism and white supremacy. A few weeks after the 
interview, Ali embarked on a hunger strike and made it clear that the strike was 
a last resort to free his body from the constant gaze of surveillance, 
dehumanisation and racial entrapment by a sadistic state. The doctor kept in 
touch with him via phone. The strike lasted for around a week and he was 
consequently hospitalised. Approximately one month after the strike ended, Ali 
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